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INTRODUCTION

[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate
and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign
finances.'

This statement by the United States Supreme Court appears to
present its position on campaign finance restrictions. It must be viewed,
however, in juxtaposition to other often quoted language of the Court
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. University of Iowa, B.B.A., 1969,
J.D., 1972.
1. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,

496-97 (1985).
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concluding that restricting the speech of one in an effort to enhance
that of another is contrary to the first amendment.2 These conclusions
led the Court to the dichotomous holding in Buckley v. Valeo3 that
campaign contribution restrictions contained in the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA)4 constitutionally were permissible, but that similar limitations on independent expenditures violated first amendment
free speech guarantees. The Court in Buckley defined corruption as the
improper exchange of large contributions for commitments from the
candidate.5 The Court concluded that corruption was a sufficient governmental concern and validated the contribution restrictions in
FECA.6 It also found, however, that independent expenditures did not
pose a similar risk of corruption.7 The Court's refusal even to consider a
possible governmental interest in equalizing the relative influence of
speakers on elections constitutionally left sacrosanct independent
expenditures.
Unfortunately, Buckley and its progeny have left campaign finance
even more troubled than it was prior to attempts at legislative reform.8
It is now more difficult for nonwealthy candidates to raise money; simultaneously, massive spending by wealthy candidates and organizations goes uncontrolled. 9 Unregulated expenditures not only have
2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) (reasoning that "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment").

3. Id.
4. Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 8-20 (1972) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, and 26 U.S.C.).
5. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
6. Id. at 45-48. The Court's per curiam opinion concluded:
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines
the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
Id. at 47. It is puzzling that the Court substituted its own judgment for that of Congress, whose
members are involved intimately in the electoral process and should have more insight into what
improperly may influence candidates. See id. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. Id. at 23-38.
8. Some commentators have viewed the decision in Buckley v. Valeo as a compromise. See,
e.g., Ashdown, Buying Speech: Campaign Spending, the New Politics, and Election Law Reform,
23 NEW ENG. L. REv. 397, 404 (1988); Fleishman & McCorkle, Level-up Rather Than Level Down:
Towards a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. & POL. 211, 222-23 (1984).
9. The interplay of money and politics hardly can be overstated. Political action committee
(PAC) contributions to congressional campaigns increased from $12 million in 1974 to $132 million

in 1986-1987.

CONG.

REs. SERv.,

REPORT ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING

6 (Update, July 2, 1987). Total

congressional campaign expenditures increased from $194.8 million in 1977-1978 to over $450 million in 1985-1986. CongressionalSpending Tops $450 Million in 1986, 13 Fed. Election Comm. 2
(1987). The price of a seat in the United States Senate now averages $3 million. N.Y. Times, Aug.
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increased the cost of running for office, but also have fueled the political action committee (PAC) phenomenon.' 0 Limits on the amount of
contributions and the impracticality of individual expenditures on behalf of candidates have made the lure of PACs as effective campaign
spenders even more attractive.
While expenditures remain constitutionally untouchable, reformers
have looked to either public financing of congressional elections" or
constitutional amendment 2 to alleviate the deleterious effect of unlimited campaign spending. The only other apparent remedial measure is
the demise of the Buckley decision itself. Although in the past the Supreme Court has remained intransigent with respect to its holding in
Buckley that independent expenditures are protected by the first
amendment,"3 the Court now may be showing signs of wavering.
Both the profundity and potential of the Supreme Court's decision
in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 4 academically titillate
critics of the Court's conclusions in Buckley. In Austin the Court for
the first time upheld expenditure restrictions, validating a Michigan
statute that prohibits corporations from making independent expenditures in connection with state candidate elections. 5 In doing so, the
majority continued to avoid addressing the equalization interest expressly. Instead, it relied on Buckley's corruption rationale, but now
with a new and different face. Although the "new corruption"' 6 discovered by the Austin majority did focus on the special nature of the cor30, 1987, at E4, col. 1. The Federal Election Commission has reported that when there is a greater
than two-to-one spending advantage it translates into a 93% chance of election. Wright, Money
and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 609, 622 (1982).
10. For example, the number of political action committees increased from 608 in 1974 to
3525 in 1984. M. STONE, FACTS ON PACs: POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES AND AMERICAN CAMPAIGN
FINANCE 10 (1984).
11. Statutes providing for public funding of congressional elections have the salutary feature
of limiting campaign expenditures. In Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme Court validated the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, which contains a similar limitation in a scheme providing for public financing of presidential elections. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-109.
12. The United States Senate recently has considered two resolutions amending the Constitution to permit campaign expenditure limitations. See S.J. Res. 26, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989);
S.J. Res. 48, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess. (1989).
13. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986);
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985);
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
14. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
15. Id. at 1401-02 (approving MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.254(1) (West 1989)). The Michigan statute was modeled on a provision of FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988), requiring corporations
and labor unions to use segregated funds to finance independent expenditures made in federal
elections. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1395 n.1.
16. This is the term used by Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Austin. See
110 S. Ct. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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porate form, the compelling governmental interest that justified the
Michigan expenditure restriction was based on a broader definition of
corruption than that found in Buckley. A careful look at the Austin
decision is necessary to determine whether it is a narrow holding or a
signal that a Supreme Court majority may be willing to utilize an expanded corruption analysis to sidestep Buckley's conclusions regarding
independent expenditures. If the Court is not yet ready to remedy the
campaign finance morass that it created fifteen years ago, then it is
time for reformers seriously to consider the other available options.
Part II of the Article discusses the narrow and broad interpretations of the new corruption theory and argues that at the very least the
Court has undermined its earlier holding in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti.17 Part II also analyzes the application of new corruption thinking to noncorporate campaign spending. Part III concludes
that the Austin analysis should extend beyond the business
corporation.

II.
A.

THE NEW CORRUPTION

The Narrow View

In Buckley the Supreme Court found that corruption and the appearance of corruption were constitutionally sufficient justifications for
the contribution limitations imposed by the Federal Election Campaign
Act."' In later cases, the Court stated unequivocally that corruption was
the only legitimate and compelling reason for restricting campaign finances. 9 The corruption to which the Court referred was limited to the
most obvious kind-political benefits given in exchange for campaign
contributions. As Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated in Federal
Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee:
Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the
prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns.
The hallmark
of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political
20
favors.

Restrictions on campaign expenditures have not fared as well.
First, the Buckley per curiam opinion concluded that expenditure limitations constituted a greater restriction on free expression interests
17. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
18. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
19. National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee, 470 U.S. at 496-97; Citizens Against
Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 297.
20. National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee, 470 U.S. at 497.
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than did contribution limits.21 Crucial to the Court's opinion was the
conclusion that expenditure limits represented a direct restraint on political expression because the only means of effective contemporary
communication is through spending-money-is-speech. 2
Second, the Supreme Court has not accepted limitations on campaign expenditures under the quid pro quo view of corruption. The
Court consistently has concluded that independent spending creates little risk of return political favors. 23 Because the Court likewise rejected
the governmental interest in leveling the relative ability of individuals
and groups to influence the outcome of elections, independent spending
became invulnerable.
The first hint that the Justices might be wavering in their intransigence regarding independent expenditures came in 1986 in Federal
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life.2 4 Massachusetts Citizens for Life involved an enforcement action by the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) under section 316 of the Federal Election
Campaign Act. This section prohibits corporations from using treasury
funds to make expenditures in candidate elections. 2 5 It also requires
21. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-23. The Court felt that the limits on contribution implicated
associational interests more than speech. Even though contributions were limited by the Act, the
opportunity to contribute nevertheless allowed both association and expression of support for a
candidate or group. To the contrary, the Court concluded that the expenditure limitations represented substantial restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech. Id.
22. The per curiam opinion stated:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society
requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails
printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall
and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and
other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.
Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
23. In National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee, the Court stated:
Unlike contributions, . . . independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines
the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee, 470 U.S. at 497 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at
47). The Court in Buckley also concluded that expenditure limitations placed a greater restriction
on first amendment interests than did contribution limits. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-23. But see
Ashdown, supra note 8, at 411 (arguing that independent expenditures may well be made, especially by political action committees, in exchange for political benefits-the ideological quid pro
quo).
24. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
25. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 316
(formerly § 321), 90 Stat. 490-92 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988)).
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that any expenditure be financed by voluntary contributions to a separate segregated fund. 6 The FEC had determined that the "Special
Election Edition" of the Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) newsletter, published and circulated from general treasury funds, violated
section 316.
Although the Supreme Court agreed with the lower federal courts
that-section 316 was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL, 28 Justice
William Brennan's opinion revealed for the first time that some limitations on independent campaign expenditures might be acceptable to a
majority of the Justices. Speaking both of the effect of large aggregations of wealth on elections and the special advantages of the corporate
form, Justice Brennan suggested in dicta that corporate spending from
the general treasury could be regulated to prevent distortion of the political process. 29 The perimeters of this new analysis, however, were circumscribed somewhat by the holding itself.
MCFL was incorporated as a nonprofit, nonstock corporation with
a stated purpose of "defend[ing] the right to life of all human beings"
through educational and political activities. 3 0 The organization had engaged in a variety of educational and legislative actions and considered
its members to be those persons who either had contributed or indicated support for its activities. Given this characterization of MCFL, a
majority of the Court concluded that the organization did not pose the
danger of corruption in which resources amassed in the economic marketplace provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.3 1 On
the contrary, the Court felt that the resources available to MCFL were
a function of the popularity of its ideas; consequently, the restrictions
in section 316 could not be applied constitutionally to it.32 Thus, the
corruption from the unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes
to which the Court referred was conceptualized more narrowly than
26. Id.
27. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 244-45. The "Special Election Edition" of
the MCFL newsletter was prepared and distributed prior to the 1978 primary elections. Although
no more than 6000 copies of any one issue of MCFL's regular newsletter ever had been published,
more than 100,000 copies of the "Special Edition" were printed for distribution. This edition of the
newsletter urged readers to vote prolife and identified candidates supporting and candidates opposing this position. In addition, a coupon was included that could be clipped and taken to the
polls to remind voters of the name of the prolife candidates. Id. at 243-44.
28. Id. at 245-51. The Court also found that the statute was applicable to MCFL's "Special
Edition" newsletter. Id.
29. Id. at 258-59.
30. Id. at 241.
31. Id. at 259.
32. Justice William Brennan's opinion held that § 441b's requirement that corporate campaign expenditures be made only through a separate segregated fund unfairly discouraged protected speech. Id. at 251-56.
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some would hope.
Justice Brennan's allusions to corporate spending polluting the political process apparently were intended to suggest the constitutional
validity of section 316 only as it applied to for-profit corporations. The
concern was that money amassed from economic activity could be diverted and spent in the political arena in ways that would promote the
corporate interest, but whose accumulation and impact would have lit33
tle correlation with the political popularity of the corporate position.
The economic decisions of individuals do not reflect political choices. In
other words, the purchase of a company's stock or products does not
indicate support for the political positions of the company's board of
directors.
The foundation of this analysis flows from the conclusion in Buckley that money spent in the course of an election campaign is protected
political expression.3 4 After rejecting the Court of Appeals' holding that
FECA's contribution and expenditure provisions regulated conduct, not
speech,35 the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion concluded that virtually every means of communicating political viewpoints required the expenditure of money-money-is-speech.36 Although it is not stated
specifically in either Massachusetts Citizens for Life or Austin, this
reasoning must have led to the new corruption analysis. Justice
Thurgood Marshall's majority opinion in Austin characterizes the new
corruption as a compelling governmental interest that justifies Michigan's restriction on corporate expression.37 Actually, however, the analysis suggests that in the case of political spending from the general
corporate treasury, money is not speech. Thus, those who are the source
of corporate funds-investors and customers-were not engaging in political expression when they parted with their money. The ability of the
33. This concern is clarified by the following juxtaposition in Justice Brennan's opinion for
the Court:
Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that resources amassed
in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace. Political "free trade" does not necessarily require that all who participate in the
political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources.
Id. at 257-58 (citing National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. at 480, and
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51). Justice Brennan then stated:
The resources in the treasury of a business corporation. . . are not an indication of popular
support for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated
decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no
reflection of the power of its ideas.
Id. at 258.
34. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15-18.
36. Id. at 19.
37. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1397-98 (1990).
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corporate structure to leverage funds from the economic sector, where
money does not talk (at least in the political sense), 38 to the political
arena, where it speaks loudly, breaks down the Buckley money-isspeech logic.
Austin confirmed this view of the new corruption thesis.3 9 Although
the Supreme Court developed its suggestions in Massachusetts Citizens
for Life about the legitimacy of limiting corporate campaign spending
into a firm constitutional holding, the majority opinion in Austin was
crafted narrowly. Justice Marshall emphasized that the mere fact that
corporations may accumulate large amounts of wealth did not sufficiently justify upholding the Michigan restriction on corporate independent campaign expenditures.40 Moreover, the statute did not attempt
"to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections. '4 1 Rather,
his opinion stressed not only the unfair impact of economically generated wealth on political campaigns, but also the special advantages of
the state-created corporate form. 4 2 The compelling state interest justifying Michigan's regulation was a type of corruption resulting from "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas. ' 43 In other words, the expenditure of money in the economic
arena does not amount to political expression.
Both MCFL and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, as nonprofit
corporations, enjoyed the advantages of the corporate form. While
MCFL was exempt from restrictions on independent campaign expenditures, the Chamber could be regulated because of its business and economic orientation. According to Justice Brennan, "the Chamber and
other business corporations" could be regulated to prevent them "from
using funds of other persons for purposes that those persons may not
44
support.
38. Some spending on communication in the economic sector, nevertheless, is entitled to constitutional protection. In the commercial speech cases, the Supreme Court held that the interest of
the public in receiving commercial information entitled such communication to first amendment
protection. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Communication of this type of information was not involved in
Massachusetts Citizens for Life or Austin.
39. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
40. Id. at 1398. 41. Id. at 1397-98 (quoting id. at 1421 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
42. Id. at 1397. The special advantages mentioned by Justice Marshall were limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1404 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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In Massachusetts Citizens for Life the Court concluded that the
nonprofit organization was more akin to a voluntary political association than a business; thus, its independent spending should not be restricted solely because of its corporate form. The Court identified three
features essential to its holding. First, MCFL was formed exclusively to
promote political ideas, not to engage in business. Its purpose ensured
that its resources would reflect its political support. Second, it had no
shareholders or other parties with a claim to its assets. This guaranteed
that those associated with the organization would have no reason to
continue support if they disagreed with its politics. Third, MCFL was
not established by a business or labor group. Moreover, it did not accept contributions from such entities. Thus, MCFL could not serve as a
conduit for the spending that created the previously identified threat to
the political interchange of ideas and opinions. 5 In Austin the Court
concluded that the Michigan Chamber of Commerce possessed none of
these characteristics. Especially damning was the fact that more than
three-quarters of the Chamber's members were business corporations.
Thus, the Chamber easily could have acted as a conduit for distortional
corporate spending.4 6
Consequently, what the Court suggested in Massachusetts Citizens
for Life and held in Austin is that money accumulated in the economic
marketplace, through the advantages of corporation law, can be regulated when diverted and spent in the political arena. 47 In other words,
the corporation's investors and customers-the source of funds in the
corporate treasury-may not support the content of corporate political
speech. Money given for one purpose but spent for another undermines
the money-is-speech logic of Buckley. As such, the state has a compelling interest to regulate corporate independent expenditures because
the restrictions themselves serve a first amendment goal.4 8
45. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263-64.
46. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398-1400.
47. See Nicholson, Basic Principlesor TheoreticalTangles: Analyzing the Constitutionality
of Government Regulation of Campaign Spending, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 589, 602-06 (1988).
Professor Nicholson was one of the first to recognize the potential of the Court's dicta in Massachusetts Citizens for Life.
48. This analysis is somewhat similar to that employed in International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977),
and more recently, Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). These cases involved
"agency shop" arrangements or union-security clauses under which nonunion members obtaining
the benefits of collective bargaining were required to pay the union either dues or agency fees. The
Supreme Court held in each case that compelling nonmember employees to contribute to union
activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining was an infringement of employees' first
amendment rights. Beck, 487 U.S. at 744-62; Abood, 431 U.S. at 232-37; Street, 367 U.S. at 746-49.
Apparently, these decisions also apply to dissenting union members who cannot be required to
support union political activities unrelated to collective bargaining. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1400
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Given this realization, one wonders where the Court's analysis is
headed. Although the precise holding in Austin is limited to business
corporations or organizations with ties to them, the Court's logic seem-

ingly also invalidates First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,49 an-

other post-Buckley holding based on the constitutional sanctity of
independent expenditures.5 0 Expanding the definition of corruption beyond the financial quid pro quo to include the corrosive effects of accumulated wealth should be encouraging to opponents of Buckley v.
Valeo. Recognizing that corporate campaign spending which does not
reflect the power of corporate political ideas distorts and corrupts the
political process reveals some sensitivity, to the equalization rationale.
B. The Broad View
1. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
As students of campaign finance law well know, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its Buckley holding in Bellotti 1 Bellotti invalidated a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporations from spending money to
influence or affect the vote on questions submitted to the voters, other
than questions materially affecting the corporation's property, business,
or assets."2 Stating that the prohibited speech was at the heart of first
amendment protection, the majority held that political speech which
otherwise would fall within the protection of the first amendment does
not lose that protection simply because its source is a corporation. 3
(citing Beck, 487 U.S. at 735, and Abood, 431 U.S. at 209, for this proposition).
49. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

50. In Bellotti the Court invalidated a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited business corporations from making contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of. . . influencing
or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting
any of the property, business or assets of the corporation." Id. at 767-68 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)).
51.

Id. at 775-95.

52. Id. at 767-68; see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977). The appellants in
Bellotti wanted to spend corporate funds to publicize their views against a proposed constitutional
amendment that would have permitted the legislature to impose a graduated individual income
tax. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that the statute was constitutional as
written because the first and fourteenth amendments protected corporate speech only with respect
to matters materially affecting the business of the corporation. The Supreme Judicial Court also
concluded that a ballot question concerning the taxation of individuals could not materially affect
the interests of a corporation. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 769-73. The United States Supreme Court
failed to address this latter question because it held that the Massachusetts court's interpretation
of a corporation's first amendment rights was too narrow. Id. at 775-86.
53. The majority opinion stated:
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could
silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than
an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
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Of the state interests advanced in Bellotti to justify the statute
under a strict scrutiny analysis, one sounds remarkably similar to the
justification relied upon by the Austin majority to uphold Michigan's
restriction on corporate expenditures. The Massachusetts Attorney
General argued that the statute protected corporate shareholders by
preventing the use of corporate resources for the promotion of views
with which some shareholders might disagree.54 The Bellotti majority,
however, found the Massachusetts law both underinclusive and overinclusive. The statute was underinclusive because it failed to address corporate lobbying and did not apply to other organized groups with
members whose status was similar to that of stockholder, such as real
estate investment trusts and labor unions.5 5 It was deemed overinclusive because (1) the statutory prohibition would apply even if the shareholders unanimously approved corporate spending on a referendum
issue, and (2) the statute ignored other controls on corporate spending
available to shareholders.56
In Austin a majority of the Court adopted the reasoning of Justice
Byron White in his Bellotti dissent.5 7 The Austin majority accepted a
variation of the Massachusetts Attorney General's argument as a compelling interest justifying the state's prohibition on independent corporate expenditures in candidate elections. Although the Austin majority
did not characterize the restriction on corporate spending as one furthering first amendment goals, as did Justice White, 8 the Court did
find compelling the state's interest in preventing corporations from corrupting the political and electoral process. 59 As Justice White reasoned
in Bellotti, corruption results from the corporate spending of funds,
amassed largely through the aid of favorable state laws, on views that
may not be supported by corporate contributors-investors and
customers.6 0
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual.
Id. at 777 (footnotes omitted).
54. The first state interest relied upon in support of the statute was that corporate spending
on a referendum issue would exert an undue influence on the outcome of the vote; consequently,
public confidence in the electoral process would be undermined. The Court found no evidence of
undue influence. It rejected this contention based on the Buckley rationale that "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id. at 788-92 (quoting Buckley, 424
U.S. at 48-49).
55. Id. at 793.
56. Id. at 794-95.
57. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396-98.
58. Bellotti, 424 U.S. at 803-04, 813-14 (White, J., dissenting).
59. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396-98.
60. Bellotti, 424 U.S. at 809-10, 812-22 (White, J., dissenting).

778
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Thus, concern for dissenting shareholders was expanded by the
Austin majority to state a broader philosophical principle, which could
be described as a first amendment interest. Wealth amassed in the economic marketplace through the aid of the corporate form can distort
the political process when used to promote views that do not reflect
public support. The Court rejected the notion that this type of corporate leveraging of funds was entitled to first amendment protection.
Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Austin shrugged off the
overinclusiveness argument." It also rejected the contention that the
Michigan law was underinclusive because of its failure to regulate the
independent expenditures of unincorporated labor unions. Justice Marshall found two crucial differences between unions and corporations.
First, even though unions can develop large treasuries, they do so without the special state-conferred advantages of the corporate structure. It
is the desire to counterbalance these advantages that provides the compelling interest for state regulation.6 2 Second, union members who disagree with the political activities of the union need not completely
disassociate themselves from the union in order to renounce those activities. An employee who objects to the union's political activities can
refuse to contribute to those activities but still receive the benefits of
union membership with respect to collective bargaining and related
functions.6 The Court thus rejected an
underinclusiveness argument
64
that it had accepted earlier in Bellotti.

61. The overinclusiveness argument made by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce in Austin
was somewhat different than that given by the Court in Bellotti. In Bellotti the majority found the
Massachusetts' statute overinclusive because it prohibited corporate expenditures even when all
shareholders were in favor of such spending, and because the policy of protecting dissenting shareholders ignored other remedies available to shareholders objecting to the actions of corporate management. See supra text accompanying note 56. In responding to the broader policy justification
given for the Michigan statute, however, the Chamber argued in Austin that the statute was substantially overinclusive because it applied to closely held corporations that did not possess large
capital reserves. The Court responded to this contention by concluding that although some corporations have not accumulated significant amounts of wealth, they still enjoy the special benefits of
the corporate structure conferred by state law and potentially can distort the political process.
Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
62. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1400.
63. Id. at 1400-01 (citing Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) and Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), discussed supra at note 48 and infra at note 90). The
Court evidently has concluded that a dissenting union member cannot be forced to contribute to
union political activities outside of collective bargaining.
64. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-95. The other aspect of underinclusiveness mentioned in
Bellotti-that the regulation did not apply to corporate lobbying-was not raised by the parties or
discussed by the Court. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion incidentally raised this underinclusiveness point. He noted that the statute obviously was underinclusive because it did not ban other
political expenditures to which a dissenting shareholder might object. The example that he gave,
however, was the statute's failure to apply to the spending of general corporate treasury funds in a
state referendum. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan found this underinclusiveness acceptable because
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Although the Michigan restriction in Austin differed from the restriction in Bellotti, the Court made no real effort to distinguish the
two provisions. The section of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act
challenged in Austin prohibits corporations from using general treasury
funds to make independent expenditures in support of or opposition to
any candidate for state office. Corporations are permitted to make such
expenditures only from segregated funds used exclusively for political purposes.15 In contrast, the restriction in Bellotti applied to ballot
measures. Thus, the Court simply could have upheld the Michigan statute based on its potential for financial quid pro quo corruption in the
form of campaign spending for political favors. This type of corruption
was recognized in Bellotti as a possible legitimate governmental interest
for restricting the expenditures of corporations in candidate elections.6 6
Clearly, this "comparable problem," not presented in Bellotti, was
put before the Court in Austin. The Michigan statute applied only to
candidate elections. Nevertheless, the majority quickly sidestepped the
opportunity to utilize this governmental interest as a justification for
the regulation. It relied instead on the broader "new corruption" theory. Justice Marshall stated for the majority:
[The Court] has recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or
apparent corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate elections. Regardless of whether this danger of "financial quid
pro quo" corruption may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
he felt that candidate elections, to which the statute applied, were at the heart of speech interests,
and thus, the State's decision to focus on them was justified. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1402-07 (Brennan, J., concurring). He failed to explain, however, why speech interests were more'profound in
candidate elections than in ballot measures or referenda. Justice Brennan also suggested that this
underinclusiveness was dictated and, thus, justified by the Court's earlier Bellotti decision. Id. at
1407 (Brennan, J., concurring). As is explained in the Article, however, Bellotti apparently was

overruled by the majority opinion in Austin itself, in which Justice Brennan joined. See infra text
accompanying notes 65-73.
65. See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 169.255(1) (West 1989). The Michigan law is patterned on
a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988) (original version at tit.
III, §§ 301-311, 86 Stat. 3, 11 (1972)), requiring corporations and labor unions to make all expenditures in federal elections through separate segregated funds. See supra note 15.
66. Justice Lewis Powell's opinion for the Court in Bellotti provided:
The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes such as the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act was the problem of corruption of elected representatives through the creation of
political debts. The importance of the governmental interest in preventing this occurrence has
never been doubted. The case before us presents no comparableproblem, and our consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election to
public office. Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or

apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate
elections.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have6 little
or no
7
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.

Actually, the Court in Austin would have had some difficulty relying on
the financial quid pro quo corruption mentioned in the Bellotti opinion.
The Michigan restriction applied only to independent expenditures: the
Court in Buckley previously had rejected the quid pro quo argument as
a justification for limitations placed on this type of campaign
spending."8
Irrespective of whether the Austin majority specifically intended to
overrule Bellotti silently, the logic of the new corruption analysis significantly undermines the latter holding. Whether candidate or ballot
measure elections, the state has a compelling interest in preventing the
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that bear no relationship
to the level of support behind the corporation's political ideas. The corruptive corporate leveraging occurs in either case.
The Court's only effort to distinguish the Bellotti holding from the
new corruption analysis was presented in Massachusetts Citizens for
Life. In Massachusetts Citizens for Life Justice Brennan, speaking of
the corrupting influence of corporate wealth, observed that "[t]he regulation imposed as a result of this concern is of course distinguishable
from the complete foreclosure of any opportunity for political speech
69
that we invalidated in the state referendum context in [Bellotti].
Justice Brennan was referring to the fact that the regulation involved
in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, section 316 of the Federal Election
Campaign Act,70 permitted corporate spending through a separate, segregated political campaign fund financed by voluntary contributions.7 1
The conclusion is inescapable that legislatures are now free to restrict
corporations to spend only from separate political funds in ballot
measures as well as candidate elections. 72 These restrictions will ensure
67. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397 (citations omitted).
68. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
69. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259 n.12
(1986); see also Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1402-03 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
70. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988).
71. The Michigan statute in Austin also permitted independent expenditures from segregated funds. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.255(1) (West 1989).
72. It should be pointed out that of the six-Justice majority, Justice John Paul Stevens concurred on the ground that the challenged Michigan statute applied only to candidate elections,
Austin, 110 S.Ct. at 1407-08 (Stevens, J., concurring), and Justice Brennan is no longer on the
Court. Conceivably, however, Justice Anthony Kennedy would have accepted the majority's new
corruption thesis as it applies to for-profit corporations because his dissenting opinion consistently
refers to "nonprofit corporations." Id. at 1416-26 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and Scalia,
J., dissenting). Although Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy's opinion along with Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, he also filed his own separate dissent. Interestingly, both Justices O'Connor and
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that "the money collected is that intended by those who contribute to
be used for political purposes and not money diverted from another
73
source."
2.

The New Corruption and Noncorporate Independent
Expenditures

The Supreme Court's decision in Austin is puzzling. Read together,
Buckley and Bellotti invalidate limitations or restrictions placed on independent corporate campaign expenditures. Austin now has overruled
at least one aspect of those decisions, making restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures in election campaigns constitutionally permissible. The question is whether the new corruption concept will further limit Buckley.
Because Justice Marshall used both broad and narrow language in
Austin, it may be premature to speculate whether a majority of the Justices is now poised to make further assaults on the sanctity of independent expenditures. This depends, it seems, on what significance is
accorded the two parts of the Court's analysis.
a. Diversion- Corporate Leveraging
If the focus of the new corruption rationale is the correlation between money spent in political campaigns and public support for the
views on which the funds are expended, it becomes difficult to confine
the majority's analysis to corporations. Although Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Austin eschews the equalization notion,74 the majority's theory actually amounts to reducing the speech of those
attempting to speak beyond the popularity of their views. Moreover,
when disproportionate speech is restricted the speech of others necessarily is enhanced. This appears to be a form of equalization. The dissenting opinions of Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy certainly
suggest this conclusion.7 5 If avoiding disproportionality is the linchpin
of the Austin holding, then it may well be applicable to the independent expenditures of individuals and groups other than corporations.
Consequently, one can make only a guarded prognosis for the continued
Scalia joined the portion of the Court's opinion in Massachusetts Citizens for Life that formulated

the new corruption argument.
73. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 258 (citing Pipefitters v. United States,
407 U.S. 385, 423-24 (1972)).
74. See supra text accompanying note 41.
75. Austin, 110 S.Ct. at 1411, 1415 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1421 (Kennedy, J., joined
by O'Connor, J. and Scalia, J., dissenting).
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vitality of the Supreme Court's remaining independent expenditure
holdings. 6
Essential to the new corruption theory is the possibility that funds
given, invested, or spent for an economic purpose might be diverted to
a political purpose. It is in this way that money expended on a political
cause may not reflect the level of support for or popularity of the particular view on which it is spent. Thus, money is not "talking" in the
Buckley sense. Whether this diversion concept limits the new corruption analysis depends on the extent of its application.
All monies to some extent are diverted from their source to other
uses. That is the nature of a free market economy. The concept applies
to the corporate investor as well as the laborer who contributes fifty
dollars to a particular candidate's campaign. The only difference is the
number of steps in the diversion. Clearly, the laborer's employer did
not necessarily intend to contribute to the employee's candidate of
choice, just as the corporate investor or purchaser of corporate products
does not necessarily support the corporation's favorite candidates. The
distinction apparently is that the employer pays .the laborer with the
understanding that the salary will be used for whatever myriad purposes the laborer desires. The same can be said, however, of corporate*
benefactors. Especially in the case of the corporate shareholder, the
money is given to the corporation with the complete understanding that
the investment will be utilized in whatever way is beneficial to the corporation. This understanding must include spending in election campaigns in order to further corporate interests." In this sense the
investment in the corporation is unrestricted. 8 Why does money talk
when it comes from an individual's paycheck, but not when its source is
the corporate treasury?
76. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1, invalidated the independent expenditure limitations placed by
FECA on persons. FECA broadly defines "person" to mean "an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, or any other organization or group of persons." 18 U.S.C. § 591(g)
(1988). Austin appears to have overruled the part of this holding that applies to corporations. The
remaining question is how far the Austin analysis extends through the above definition. Citizens
Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), struck down a Berkeley, California ordinance that placed a $250 limitation on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose
ballot measures. In addition to finding that there was no risk of Buckley-type corruption in ballot
measure elections, the Court concluded that the contribution limits also inherently operated as
limits on the expenditures of those wishing to join others to advocate common views. Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985), invalidated a provision of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act making it a criminal offense for
any political committee to expend more than $1000 to further the election of any candidate receiving public financing.
77. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Similarly, a corporate customer buys a corporation's products without thought or restriction on the use to which the purchase price will be put. When the activities of the corporation do
become an issue, the conscientious consumer simply may refuse to buy the corporation's products.
In such a case, this money, then, is not available for corporate use.
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The Court's decision in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, holding
unconstitutional the federal restriction on corporate spending as it applied to an ideological, nonprofit corporation, 79 evidently circumscribes
the diversion theory. It suggests that when the contributor of funds specifically authorizes their use for political purposes, no distortion of the
electoral process occurs; thus, the spending is protected constitutionally. This explanation at least facially distinguishes the funds available
to a business corporation from contributions to an ideological or political organization, but it does not identify the point of demarcation in the
distribution of capital when the economic and political spheres intersect. The money available to a political group necessarily originates
somewhere in the economic sector.
Even this narrower view of the diversion notion creates problems in
attempting to limit the new corruption analysis to corporations. Superficially, it could be argued that a wealthy individual who makes large
independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate or his own candidacy has made a clear decision to spend his money in this way. Consequently, there is no diversion and corruption. This argument poses at
least two problems. First, many affluent persons acquire or compound
their wealth through corporations. One reason that the Supreme Court
invalidated the expenditure restrictions as applied to MCFL but upheld
them with respect to the Michigan Chamber of Commerce was that
MCFL did not accept corporate funds whereas the Chamber of Commerce did. If an organization that receives corporate contributions potentially can distort the political process, it is difficult to see why an
individual who receives corporate dividends, interest, or income is not
also a source of corruption. 0 Second, and more important, large expenditures by an individual in an election campaign, either independently or as a candidate, are even less a reflection of public support
than a corporation's expenditures from its general treasury. To some
extent it can be assumed that contributors to a corporation would support corporate spending on matters that would further the corporate
interest and thus the value of their investment.8 1 Spending by a wealthy
individual may have no correlation to public support for his position.2
Consequently, the disproportionality rationale easily could be applied
here. While the independent expenditures of most individuals probably
79. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27. The decision in Austin emanated from the
language and analysis of the Massachusetts Citizens for Life opinion.
80. Justice Kennedy's dissent in Austin recognizes this parallel. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at
1422 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
82. Justice Scalia's dissent in Austin recognizes this parallel. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1411
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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have little effect in political campaigns, restricting the spending of
wealthy candidates from their personal resources could have a tremendous impact on elections.8 3
Another difficulty with limiting the Court's distortion theory to
business corporations is that many ideological groups, whether themselves incorporated or not, receive corporate contributions. Under Massachusetts Citizens for Life and Austin, incorporation is not the
determining factor. Receipt of corporate money is the key. Of the three
factors that must be met by an organization in order to avoid legislative
restrictions on spending, the third requires that no money be generated
or received from the business activity of corporations. The Court concluded that this prevented corporations "from serving as conduits for
the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace. '8 4 This factor most notably distinguished the Michigan Chamber
of Commerce from MCFL, permitting application of expenditure restrictions to the former but not the latter."' One only needs to peruse
the amici curiae briefs in Austin on behalf of the Chamber to recognize
the potential reach of the Court's decision."
The Massachusetts Citizens for Life holding may shield some of
these groups from their main concern-application of spending restrictions to all organizations using the corporate form. 7 Nevertheless, any
group accepting contributions from business corporations, whether itself incorporated or ideological in orientation, theoretically is subject to
expenditure regulation under Massachusetts Citizens for Life and Austin.8 Thus, Justice Brennan apparently was correct when he stated at
83. FECA originally contained these restrictions. Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates were limited to spending $50,000 from personal or family funds; senatorial candidates were
limited to $35,000; and most candidates for the House of Representatives were limited to $25,000.
These limitations were declared unconstitutional in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-54.
It would be more difficult to place overall limits on a candidate's campaign expenditures (as
did FECA) under the diversion theory since most of these funds probably come from contributors
who have made a clear political choice.
84. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264.
85. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1400.
86. The list of parties submitting amici curiae briefs included the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), the Center for Public Interest Law, the American Medical Association, the National Association of Realtors, the American Insurance Association, the National Organization for
Women, Greenpeace Action, the National Abortion Rights Action League, the National Right to
Work Committee, the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the Fund for the Feminist Majority, the Washington Legal Foundation, and the Allied Educational Foundation. Id. at 1424
(Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Justice Kennedy's suggestion that the Austin holding applies to the Sierra Club and the
ACLU, and that their independent expenditures may now be restricted along with the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, is not accurate simply because the former organizations operate under the
corporate form. Id. at 1418 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting). They
may well fall under the Court's holding in Massachusetts Citizens for Life.
88. In other words, Justice Kennedy's conclusion would be correct if the Sierra Club and the
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the end of his opinion constitutionally exempting MCFL from spending
restrictions: "It may be that the class of organizations affected by our
holding today will be small." 9
Even if an organization is able to avoid corporate money, it will not
necessarily be immune to the new distortion and corruption analyses.
Whenever an individual contributes to an association there is no guarantee that the money will be used for the specific cause for which it was
contributed. It may be diverted by the group for some other purpose.
Once the contribution is made, the contributor totally delegates authority to the organization to spend the money in whatever way the organization sees fit. This is a result strikingly similar to that of the investor
who buys stock in a corporation.9
The Federal Election Commission made this argument with respect
to groups such as MCFL.9 The majority in Massachusetts Citizens for
Life rejected rather cavalierly this variation of the distortion concept.
Justice Brennan distinguished groups like MCFL, whose contributors
authorize use of their money for political purposes, from investment
funds or union dues that are contributed for economic gain.92 Actually,
however, the two sides of this dichotomy tend to merge. On the one
hand, corporate investors must realize that their money will be utilized
for a variety of purposes, including political activity that potentially
ACLU, irrespective of their corporate form, accepted contributions from business corporations. See
id. at 1405 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring).
89. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264.
90. The labor cases are distinguishable. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.
209 (1977) and Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), the Supreme Court held
that nonunion member employees who were required to pay dues or fees to the union under
"agency shop" arrangements or union-security clauses for representation in collective bargaining
could not be compelled through such fees to support the union's political activity unrelated to the
collective bargaining function. The primary difference between payments made to a collective bargaining unit and contributions to or investments in other organizations is that in the latter case
the payments are completely voluntary. Fees paid to a union for representation in collective bargaining are voluntary only in the sense that the person does not have to seek employment from an
employer who is a party to a collective bargaining agreement. The economic coercion, however, is
obvious.
To the extent that Abood and Beck apply to union members, see Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1400-01,
the analysis probably runs closer to the voluntary contributor or corporate investor: unions presumably engage only in activities that further union interests and, consequently, would be supported by the membership. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, federal law since 1907 has
prohibited the contribution of union dues (as well as corporate funds) to political campaigns. See
Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864-65. FECA permits unions (and corporations)
to establish separate segregated funds to be used for political spending. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(c)
(1988). Presumably, independent expenditures by unions in election campaigns are still protected
by Buckley, with the first amendment rights of dissenting members being shielded by Abood and
Beck.
91. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 260-61.
92. Id.
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may benefit the corporation. 93 This realization clearly applies to lobbying if not outright investment in political campaigns. On the other
hand, although the motivation of contributors to ideological associations primarily is political, these organizations from time to time may
engage in activities not supported by some of their contributing members.94 The American Civil Liberties Union's defense of the Nazi
Party's right to march in Skokie, Illinois9 5 presents the ultimate example. At the very least, some distortion of the political process occurs
because the leadership of these groups may choose to support a candidate or cause that would not have achieved the same level of support
from contributors acting individually.9 6 The only situation in which
there is a relatively direct correlation between dollars and ideas is the
case of the one-cause or one-issue organization, such as MCFL.97 Again,
to paraphrase Justice Brennan, the class of organizations fitting this
description will be small.
b.

Special Advantages-The Corporate Form

The other way to view the Massachusetts Citizens for Life-Austin
theory is to focus on the corporate form-the special legal characteristics provided by state law that facilitate the accumulation of wealth and
leverage from which the corporation can parlay money into the political
process. In other words, the true concern of the above opinions may be
state-created corporate power that fosters the aggregation of large
treasuries.
Even if the focus on the corporate form is the fulcrum for permit93. The understanding of the dues-paying union member may be somewhat different because
of the heavy regulation of union activity and court decisions requiring union officials to account for
money spent on political activity. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 735; Abood, 431 U.S. at 209.
94. Justice Brennan also distinguished political organizations such as MCFL by the ease with
which dissenting contributors can withdraw. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 260-61.
Although it is true that corporate shareholders have an economic incentive for investing, particular
corporate stock is not such a unique commodity as to make disassociation and reinvestment a
major sacrifice. Correspondingly, those who disagree with the expenditures of a political organization can refuse to contribute further, but at this point their money has been spent. In this sense
they are much like the purchasers of corporate products who discover that they are not comfortable with the politics of the corporation.
95. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978); Village of
Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
96. This does not ignore freedom of association. It can be argued that the individuals have
not associated for the purpose of supporting a particular candidate selected by the committee
without consulting contributors.
97. The one-issue political committee can be distinguished from individuals in terms of the
potential distortion between spending and public support. Whereas an individual could make enormous expenditures without any relation to public support, contributions by individuals to political
committees are limited by FECA to $1000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1988). Therefore, the amalgamated
funds of a one-issue committee are a rough indication of support for that issue.
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ting restrictions on independent spending, the analysis cannot end with
corporations. Corporations are not the only source of distortion; likewise, they are not the only recipients of legally created advantages. Justice Scalia notes that both associations and private individuals are
given all kinds of special advantages by the state, including tax breaks,
contract awards, public employment, and outright cash subsidies. 8 Although the state-accorded corporate advantages mentioned by the
Court-limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the
accumulation and distribution of assets"9 -are not insignificant, they
may be no more significant than Justice Scalia's list. Certainly they are
no more influential in amassing large treasuries than the legal advantages accorded other institutions such as charitable and religious organizations. These groups not only enjoy tax exempt status, 10 0 but
contributions are also tax deductible for their benefactors, 10 1 an obvious
encouragement to donate. It is hard to imagine a more substantial gov10 2
ernmentally created advantage.
One final observation must be made about this special advantages
prong of the new corruption analysis. Clearly, Justice Scalia is correct
when he points out in his dissent that the Court consistently has held
that the state cannot condition special advantages on the forfeiture of
constitutional rights. 10 3 The most plausible argument for ignoring this
principle is that it is inapplicable to corporations, which are creatures
of the state and as such are regulated and restricted in ways that individuals and other organizations are not. Although Chief Justice Rehn98. Austin, 110 S.Ct. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One can argue that the Supreme Court
itself has conferred special advantages on political action committees by the decisions in Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985). By holding that the independent expenditures of political
committees were not subject to limitation or restriction, the Court made it possible for these
groups to engage effectively in campaign spending. Individuals, by the Court's own admission, are
likely to be rather ineffectual and possibly counterproductive in making their own independent
expenditures in election campaigns. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
99. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
100. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1990). Lobbying by these organizations is restricted, see id. §
501(h), but apparently no limitations are placed on campaign spending.
101. See id. § 170.
102. Interestingly, the inverse, albeit somewhat disingenuous, way of looking at the special
advantages point is to argue that because Congress has granted no special benefits to corporations
they are immune from the expenditure restrictions in federal law. The response to this, I suppose,
would be that the Court was speaking of governmentally created advantages generally and not
those created by any particular governmental entity.
103. Austin, 110 S.Ct. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968) and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 404 (1963) (stating that "[i]t
is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege")
(footnote omitted).
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quist expressed this view in his dissenting opinion in Bellotti,0 4 the
Court consistently has rejected this notion. 10 5 In Bellotti, Massachusetts Citizens for Life, and Austin the Court found the particular corporate political speech at issue to be at the core of first amendment
protection, requiring any restrictions to withstand a strict scrutiny
analysis. 10 6 Thus, allowing state-created special advantages to become
part of the compelling interest justification for restrictions on corporate
speech is inconsistent with these earlier Court pronouncements.
The conclusion to be drawn from Massachusetts Citizens for Life
and Austin might be that corporations, as fictitious (and powerful)
creatures of state law, should not be entitled to the same freedom of
political expression as other groups and individuals. If this is the case,
the Court should have so stated in a forthright manner.
III. CONCLUSION
Ensuring that money spent in political campaigns has some relation to public support and has not been diverted from another source
may not be the absolute equivalent of restricting the speech of some in
order to enhance the voice of others. It is at least, however, an attempt
to avoid the political pollution that uncontrolled infusions of money can
cause. Although the Austin majority disavowed any effort to level the
relative influence of speakers on elections, the new corruption notion
that campaign expenditures should reflect popular support is not entirely foreign to this rationale. The policy underlying the equalization
argument is not that money is bad for elections but that money should
not be spent disproportionately by those who happen to have it. Heavy
spending by the financially advantaged may bear little correlation to
public support of the viewpoints or candidates on which the money is
spent. A majority of the Court has now recognized this phenomenon.
The Austin majority was not concerned merely with disproportionate expenditures. It was concerned also with the political utilization of
funds diverted from another source. It is this latter limitation that has
104. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822-28 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
105. The corporate speech cases have not focused so much on the rights of the corporate
speaker as they have on the function served by corporate speech. The Court has stressed that the
role of corporate speech-whether from the press, from corporations in the business of communication or entertainment, or commercial-is the dissemination of information and ideas to the public. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
106. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396; Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 251-52; Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 775-86.
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the potential to temper Austin's holding. Nevertheless, some things are
clear. Importantly, Austin permits legislatures to restrict the independent campaign expenditures of business corporations. The restrictions
can apply not only to General Motors, AT&T, and the First National
Bank of Boston, but to all corporations generating funds in the economic sector. 107 Beyond this, the Austin analysis apparently permits restrictions on the spending of any organization, whether incorporated or
not, that accepts corporate contributions or donations." 8 Again, reflection on the amici curiae briefs in Austin indicates the profundity of this
conclusion.1 0 9 In other words, Austin seems to apply to ideological or
politically based organizations (especially if incorporated) that accept
corporate contributions.
The other conclusion which can be reached with a relative degree
of confidence is that the new corruption concept does not apply to the
independent expenditures of one-issue political organizations such as
MCFL that do not accept corporate contributions. For these groups,
independent spending remains constitutionally protected." 0
Between the above conclusions, doubt remains with respect to the
future of the new corruption framework. Nonetheless, skepticism regarding its further potential may be premature. The prognosis for expansion must incorporate the votes of the various Justices who have
passed on the question. For example, in Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, the case source of the new corruption theory, four Justices dissented on the ground that campaign expenditure restrictions constitutionally could be applied to nonprofit political corporations such as
MCFL. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, argued that
differences among corporations are differences in degree rather than
kind; consequently, the Court should defer to Congress's judgment in
regulating the expenditures of all corporations. Despite this reasoning,
it is hard to see much of a distinction between the nonprofit ideological
corporation in Massachusetts Citizens for Life and other political associations or committees with large treasuries at their disposal. In the
case of political organizations such as MCFL little is gained by the corporate form.
107. This would include, for example, law firms, banks, real estate agencies, and all small
closely held corporations.
108. Again, the Court cast this broad net in order to prevent such organizations from serving
as conduits for the type of direct spending that threatens the political marketplace. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264.
109. Although these groups all are incorporated and now fall under the corporate aspects of
the Court's holding, the conduit point clearly applies to any organization receiving corporate
money, regardless of whether the recipient group itself is incorporated.
110. This is, of course, the holding in Massachusetts Citizens for Life. See 479 U.S. at 263-
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In Austin the new corruption dicta ripened into constitutional doctrine with the addition of Justices Brennan and Marshall to the four
Massachusetts Citizens for Life dissenters. Even though the new corruption concerns of Justices Brennan and Marshall are related more to
business corporations, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce is hardly a
classic example of corporate leveraging.""
Whether or not the new corruption analysis has a future, the beneficial feature of Massachusetts Citizens for Life and Austin is that the
grip of Buckley and the old corruption theory on the sanctity of independent expenditures has weakened. 2 If the new corruption analysis
effectively can circumvent the outright overruling of this aspect of
Buckley, it may not be necessary for Congress to continue to struggle
with the troublesome issue of election law reform, or with the more
drastic and difficult remedy of a constitutional amendment to permit
legislative limitations on independent campaign expenditures.

111. Another interesting voting pattern is depicted by the votes of Justices O'Connor and
Scalia. Both joined the portion of Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life that articulated the new corruption rationale. Both, however, then dissented in Austin when the analysis was utilized to uphold spending restrictions applied to the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce. Justice Kennedy, who also dissented in Austin, was not yet a member of
the Court when Massachusetts Citizens for Life was decided. Justice Brennan has since retired.
His seat on the Court has been filled by Justice David Souter.
112. A further indication of the Supreme Court's increased willingness to permit government
regulation of campaign finance can be found in the denial of certiorari in Gard v. Wisconsin State
Elections Board, 456 N.W.2d 809, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990). The Wisconsin statute upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court placed a cap on the total amount of contributions a candidate for state or local office could accept from all committees, including party-related committees
and political action committees. Once the cap is reached, the candidate cannot accept any further
contributions from committees. Because this cap effectively nullifies the associational and speech
rights of committees wishing to contribute (and individuals desiring to associate and contribute
through committees), the principles of Buckley v. Valeo would appear to be violated.

